Epistemic virtue

The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one's thought life. The epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition, as:

• attentiveness
• circumspection
• coachability
• creativity
• discernment
• discretion
• foresight
• intellectual honesty
• intellectual humility
• imaginitiveness
• interpretive sensitivity
• objectivity
• perceptiveness
• prudenc/practical wisdom
• tenacity
• truthfulness
• understanding
• wisdom
• warrant

These can be contrasted to the epistemic vices such as:

• close-mindedness
• curiosity [see below]
• intellectual dishonesty
• dogmatism
• epistemic blindness
• folly
• gullibility
• obtuseness
• self-deception
• superficiality of thought
• superstition
• willful naivete
• wishful thinking

Note that in this context curiosity bears the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things, in contrast to the positive studious.

External links

• Virtue Epistemology by John Greco

• The Crisis in Contemporary Epistemology by W. Jay Wood

• Epistemic akrasia (irrationality) as a deficit of virtue by Christopher Hookway

• Is Inclusion an Epistemic Virtue? by Harvey Siegel

• Review of James Montmarquet's Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility by Jonathan L. Kvanvig